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The non-tradability of human capital is often cited for the failure of traditional asset pricing theory
to explain agents' portfolio holdings.  In this paper we argue that the opposite might be true --- traditional
models might not be able to explain agent portfolio holdings because they do not explicitly account
for the fact that human capital does trade (in the form of labor contracts).  We derive wages endogenously
as part of a dynamic equilibrium in a production economy.    Risk is shared in labor markets because
firms  write bilateral labor contracts that insure workers, allowing agents to achieve a Pareto optimal
allocation even when the span of asset markets is restricted to just stocks and bonds.  Capital markets
facilitate this risk sharing because it is there that firms offload the labor market risk they assumed from
workers.  In effect, by investing in capital markets investors provide insurance to wage earners who
then optimally choose not to participate in capital markets. The model can produce some of the most
important stylized facts in asset pricing: (1) limited asset market participation, (2) the seemingly high
equity risk premium,  (3) the very large disparity in the volatility of consumption and the volatility
of asset prices, and (4) the time dependent correlation between consumption growth and asset returns.
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walden@haas.berkeley.edu.A commonly held view amongst nancial economists is that a signicant fraction of wealth
consists of non-tradable assets, most notably human capital wealth. Indeed, this hypothesis
is often used to explain why one of the key predictions of the CAPM does not hold, that all
agents hold the same portfolio of risky assets. Because investors should use the capital markets
to diversify as much risk as possible, and because non-tradable human capital exposure varies
across individuals, investors should optimally choose to hold dierent portfolios of risky assets.
Although this explanation certainly has the potential to explain the cross sectional variation
in portfolio holdings, it also necessarily implies wide stock market participation. However, the
fact is that the majority of people do not participate in the capital markets. Not only do these
individuals appear to eschew the opportunity to partially hedge their human capital exposure,
the hedging of human capital risk does not appear to be a primary motivator for the minority
of people who do participate in capital markets. Instead, the anecdotal evidence suggests that
rather than a desire to hedge, what motivates most investors is a willingness take on additional
risk because they nd the risk return tradeo attractive.1 The object of this paper is to put
forward a plausible explanation for these two characteristics of investor behavior.
The most commonly cited explanation for why most people do not participate in capital
markets is barriers to entry, although in economies such as the United States it is dicult to
accept that signicant economic barriers to entry exist that prevent people from participating.
Instead, most researchers cite educational barriers to entry because research has shown that ed-
ucation level is strongly correlated with participation.2 But the problem with this explanation
for limited stock market participation is that it does not address the question of why the edu-
cational barriers exist at all. After all, we see wide participation in arguably more complicated
nancial products such as mortgages, auto leases and insurance. In these cases the educational
barriers to entry were removed by the motivation to make prots | rms invested considerable
resources in educating people so they could sell these products. Given the welfare gain to hedg-
ing non-tradable human capital, why does a similar economic motivation to educate consumers
to hold stocks apparently not exist?
Market incompleteness may potentially oer an explanation for limited stock market partic-
ipation. For instance, the asset span might be so \narrow" that the stock market oers little
opportunity for Pareto improving trades. Although rarely cited explicitly, this explanation is
implicit in the literature on non-traded wealth. But, for this explanation to hold water, one
must also then account for why the asset span does not endogenously expand. In fact, the
span of traded assets has changed only marginally in recent years, despite the explosion in the
number of new assets. More importantly, one would not naturally expect incompleteness to
result in non-participation. Indeed, the low correlation between human capital and stock mar-
1For example, considerable resources are devoted to advising people on how to nd high return investments
whereas advice on investments with good hedging characteristics is largely non-existent.
2Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) document the relation between education and participation and Hong, Kubik, and
Stein (2004) document that non-formal education, such as social interaction, is also correlated with participation.
1ket returns documented in Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) would suggest that despite the
incompleteness, the stock market oers diversication benets which would imply wide partic-
ipation. Thus, market incompletness appears to be an unlikely explanation for limited stock
market participation.
If frictions, like barriers to entry and market incompleteness, are not preventing agents from
participating, then they must be choosing not to participate. One possibility is that agents'
initial endowments are naturally so close to a Pareto optimal allocation that there is little
reason to engage in further trade. But considering the heterogeneity in actual endowments,
this explanation seems implausible. A more plausible possibility is that some agents are able to
achieve their Pareto optimal allocation through trade in other markets and therefore trading in
stock markets provides no incremental benet.
In this paper, we argue that what traditional models of investment ignore are other markets
on which people share risk. Building on this insight, we identify the labor market as one
such market and posit that the unwillingness of some individuals to use capital markets is a
consequence of the fact that they are able to share enough risk through their wage contracts
so that the capital markets oer little incremental benet. A Pareto optimal allocation can
therefore be achieved even with the \narrow" asset span we observe in actual stock markets
implying that limited stock market participation is an ecient equilibrium outcome.
We focus on labor markets because they are an ideal place to share risk. The structure of
most rms has historically been built around long-term tailored labor contracts between the rm
and its workers. Indeed, viewed this way, one might wonder why all risk cannot be optimally
shared in labor markets. The reason is that long-term labor contracts are not necessarily ecient
for all employees | some employees are better o retaining the exibility to switch jobs. Because
of this labor market mobility, to achieve ecient risk sharing, asset markets are also required.
Our results call into question one of the basic assumptions in asset pricing | that because
asset markets do not span labor risk, human capital is not traded and so most wealth is non-
tradable. In our equilibrium, the labor market has an important role in sharing risk, eectively
allowing rms to insure workers. That implies that the owners of the rm are the ultimate
insurers of this human capital risk. Consequently, shareholders must be compensated for taking
on this additional risk, so the risk premium for holding equity is considerably higher than the
risk premium for holding pure consumption risk. Indeed, by parameterizing our model we are
able to show that it is not dicult to reproduce the observed level of the equity risk premium
with realistic values of risk aversion, the risk free rate, consumption growth and consumption
volatility.
By recognizing the important role of labor contracts in the riskiness of equity, we demonstrate
why, in an otherwise standard neoclassical model of asset prices, the volatility of equity prices
might bear little apparent relation to the volatility of consumption. One of the most important
empirical facts that the standard neoclassical model of asset prices appears to be unable to
2explain is the seeming disconnect between the volatility of consumption and asset prices. Not
only is consumption volatility signicantly lower than the volatility of asset prices, but the
two series behave manifestly dierently. For example, average quarterly volatility of the S&P
500 index is 68% higher during recessions (as identied by the NBER).3 Yet, the concomitant
increase in consumption volatility is much smaller if it exists at all | over the period 1947-2009,
the point estimate of the volatility of (seasonally adjusted) quarterly GDP growth in NBER
recessions is only 11% higher than in expansions.4 As we will show, for a reasonable choice of
parameter values, our model can quantitatively match this stylized fact. We can also explain
a related empirical nding: that equity wealth is considerably more volatile and human capital
wealth is less volatile than total wealth.5 Because human capital wealth is traditionally measured
using wage income, that is, the income that results once risk sharing has already taken place in
the labor market, traditional measures underestimate the volatility of human capital wealth.
Finally, the model implies a time varying (and a low unconditional) correlation between
consumption growth and equity returns in line with what has been observed empirically. For
example, Duee (2005) shows that the conditional correlation between consumption growth and
equity returns is almost zero when the equity wealth-to-consumption ratio is low, whereas the
correlation is high when the equity wealth-to-consumption ratio is high. This is exactly what our
model predicts and, further, it suggests that the degree of heterogeneity in labor productivity
should be a powerful instrument in a conditional asset pricing test. Our model also implies a
low unconditional correlation between labor income and equity returns, in line with Fama and
Schwert (1977).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide a brief literature review.
In sections 2-4 we introduce the model and derive several theoretical implications. Section 5
provides a simple calibration to realistic parameters, and section 6 makes some concluding
remarks. All proofs are left to the appendix.
1 Background
The idea that one role of the rm is to insure its workers' human capital risk dates at least
as far back as Knight (1921). Knight takes as a primitive that the job of worker and manager
entails taking on dierent risks and notes that entrepreneurs bear most of the risk. Using
this idea Kihlstrom and Laont (1979) endogenizes who, in a general equilibrium, becomes an
entrepreneur and who becomes a worker. Less risk averse agents choose to be entrepreneurs
who then optimally insure workers. However, the wage contract in that paper is exogenously
3It is 21.4% in recessions and 12.7% at other times. Quarterly volatility is dened to be the standard deviation
of daily returns of the S&P 500 index over the quarter over the period 1962-2009. This dierence is highly
statistically signicant.
4Using quarterly data published by the BEA, the volatility of GDP growth in recessions is 4.66% while is is
4.19% at other times over the 1947-2009 time period.
5See, for example, Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Verdelhan (2007).
3imposed rather than an endogenous response to the desire to optimally share risk and so the
resulting equilibrium is not Pareto ecient.
The papers that rst recognized the importance of endogenizing the wage contract, and
therefore the ones most closely related to our paper, are Dreze (1989) and Danthine and Don-
aldson (2002). Like us, Dreze (1989) considers the interaction between a labor and capital
market in general equilibrium and focuses on ecient risk sharing. Our point of departure is
how we model production | Dreze does not consider the implication of productive heterogene-
ity. Consequently, there is no natural reason (beyond dierences in risk aversion and wealth)
for some workers to insure other workers in Dreze's model. Hence, the model does not explain
limited capital market participation or focus on the return to bear labor risk.
Danthine and Donaldson (2002), like us, explicitly model both labor and nancial markets
with agent heterogeneity. Their model features investors and workers, but, importantly, Dan-
thine and Donaldson (2002) do not allow workers to invest or investors to work. In that model
investors are endowed with wealth rather than productivity and hence have a precautionary
reason to save which they do by investing in rms. Because this motive is missing in our model,
prices must adjust to induce some workers to invest. This is a key dierence between the two
models and is responsible for the stark dierences in some of the models' implications. Because
workers have to be induced, in our model, to take on the additional risks of equity, we get a large
equity premium while the equity risk premium in Danthine and Donaldson (2002) is small.6
Our paper also contributes to the large literature, that started with Mayers (1972), studying
the eect of non-tradable wealth in nancial markets. The main results in that literature are that
investors should no longer hold the same portfolio of risky assets and the single factor pricing
relation must be adjusted. Although Fama and Schwert (1977) nds little evidence supporting
Mayer's model, both Campbell (1996) and Jagannathan and Wang (1997) nd that adding a
measure of human capital risk signicantly increases the explanatory power of the CAPM. Santos
and Veronesi (2006) nd that the labor income to consumption ratio has predictive power for
stock returns and can help explain risk premia in the cross section. Because wage contracts
provide insurance for human capital risk, our model implies that wages (the typical measure of
human capital used in the literature) should have explanatory power for stock returns.
Because most of the theoretical predictions of the neoclassical asset pricing model rely on
eectively complete markets, initially researchers were tempted to attribute the failure of those
models to market incompleteness. However, Telmer (1993) and Heaton and Lucas (1996) con-
vincingly argue that market incompleteness cannot account for important puzzles such as the
apparently high equity risk premium. As we show in this paper, quite the opposite intuition
might be true. The failure of the models might stem from the fact that agents actually share risk
more completely than is supposed in the literature. If labor markets eectively share risk, then
6Danthine and Donaldson (2002) can only get a large premium by introducing market frictions that restrict
risk sharing.
4because equity holders are the ultimate insurers of human capital risk, they will demand a high
risk premium. As we will demonstrate, our results are consistent with the ndings in Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991) and Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) in that those who choose not
to participate are less wealthy, less educated and more reliant on wage income as their source
of wealth. Furthermore, consistent with the anecdotal evidence, the primary motivation for
investing in capital markets is the attractive risk return tradeo oered, not a desire to hedge
human capital risk.
2 Model
Like any source of risk, human capital risk has both an idiosyncratic component and a systematic
component. Although the idiosyncratic component is likely to be large, especially early in a
person's career, we will focus exclusively on the systematic component because we are interested
in the implications of how agents share risk in the economy. Idiosyncratic risk, by its very nature,
can be diversied away, so there is little reason for any agent to hold this risk in a complete
market equilibrium. Consequently, the risk sharing implications of sharing idiosyncratic risk
are well understood.7
Given our objective to study how systemic risk is shared in the economy, our model must
include heterogeneous agents. An important source of individual heterogeneity in the economy is
worker exibility: Some workers only have access to a single production technology while others
can choose between production technologies. Building on this insight we model productivity
as follows. Our economy consists of a continuum of workers that produce a single, perishable,
consumption good. Workers produce goods using a productive technology that has a common
component and an individual component we term a worker's production technology.
Formally, there is a closed set of production technologies (industries), P  [0;1][0;K], for
some K > 0. Each inexible agent only has access to a single production technology in this set,
(b;f), and produces At(b+fs) of a consumption good, where At  A0ert is the non-stochastic8
part of production common to all agents, and s is a state variable that captures the current
state of the economy. Flexible agents have access to every production technology in P. The
production technology set has the properties that (0;K) 2 P, (1;0) 2 P, (b;K) 2 P ) b = 0
and (1;f) 2 P ) f = 0.
The dynamics of At are meant to capture overall economic growth and allows us to model
7Although it's not the focus of the paper, Harris and Holmstr om (1982) makes it clear how agents share
idiosyncratic labor risk. The paper shows that most, but not all, of this risk can be removed by the labor
contract. Under the optimal labor contract rms insure all agents against negative realizations of idiosyncratic
labor risk but agents remain exposed to some positive realizations. Of course, the owners of these rms do not
have to expose themselves to this labor risk because by holding a large portfolio of rms, they can diversify the
risk away.
8It is straightforward to extend our analysis to allow stochastic growth in At, as long as innovations in At are
independent of innovations in s.
5recessions as a relative drop in productivity. The stochastic process s is a diusion process on
R+ that summarizes the state of the world:
ds = (s)dt + (s)d!:
We will model s as a mean-reverting square root process,
ds = (s   s)dt + 
p
sd!; (1)
where the condition 2s > 2 ensures positivity. The mean-reversion introduces a business cycle
interpretation and is useful for calibrations, although, as we shall see, much of the theory goes
through for general (s) and (s) so long as  and  are smooth,  is strictly positive, and the
growth conditions j(s)j  c1(1+s), (s)  c2(1+s) are satised for nite constants, c1 and c2.
It is natural to dene a recession as states for which s < s, whereas an expansion is when s > s.
Let the inexible agents be indexed by i 2 I = [0;], where 0 <  < 1, with agent i
working in industry (bi;fi), where we assume that bi and fi are measurable functions that are
nondegenerate in the sense that it is neither the case that the full mass of agents work in industry







(bi + fis)di =  b +  fs: (2)
Note that 0 <  b < 1 and 0 <  f < K.
The rest of the agents in the economy are exible agents, comprising mass 1   , i 2 F =
(1   ;1]. Because these agents have access to any production technology in P and are free to
move between production technologies at any point in time, for a given s, it is optimal for them
to work in an industry (b;f), that solves
(b;f) = argmax
(b;f)2P
b + fs; (3)
leading to the optimal productivity of exible agents
AtKF(s) = A0ertKF(s)
where
KF(s)  b(s) + f(s)s: (4)
Notice that, at any point in time, all exible agents choose to work in industries that generate
6the same output. Furthermore, we have
Lemma 1 The optimal production function of exible agents satises:




(c) KF(s) is a convex function of s.
We next assume that exible agents can work part time in dierent industries, i.e., if (b1;f1) 2
P and (b2;f2) 2 P, then (b1 + (1   )b2;f1 + (1   )f2) 2 P for all  2 [0;1]. This implies
that for all b 2 [0;1] there is a (b;f) 2 P. Now, exible agents will only consider production
technologies on the ecient frontier, (b;f(b)), where f(b)
def = max(b;f)2Pff : (b;f) 2 Pg, and it
follows immediately that f is a strictly decreasing, concave function dened on b 2 [0;1], such
that f(0) = K and f(1) = 0. Going forward, we make the additional technical assumptions that
f is strictly concave, twice continuously dierentiable, and that f0(0) = 0, and f0(1) =  1.
Under these assumptions it is easy to show that
Lemma 2 KF(s) is a twice continuously dierentiable, strictly convex function, such that
K0
F(0) = 0 and lims!1 K0
F(s) = K.
Lemma 2 ensures that KF(s) is a diusion process (which is, of course, also true of KI(s)). The
total output in the economy at time t is:
AtKtot(st) = A0ertKtot(st); (5)
where
Ktot(s)  KI(s) + (1   )KF(s); (6)
implying that Ktot(s) is also a diusion process.
Figure 1 plots a production function for a exible and inexible worker. When the two
workers work in the same industry they are equally productive. At all other times the exible
agent will be more productive than the inexible agent. The next lemma adds the additional
observation that the exible worker's mobility implies that exible workers will move into safer
jobs in bad times and riskier jobs in good times so that exible workers will have a natural
advantage in providing insurance to inexible workers.
Lemma 3 The following results hold for the volatility of the agents' productivity:


















Figure 1: Optimal production technology functions of exible and inexible agents,
KF(s) and KI(s): In this example, all inexible agents work in the same industry, so KI and
KF intersect at the point where exible agents choose the same productivity as inexible agents
have. If there is dispersion among inexible agents, KI lies strictly below KF, since f is strictly
concave.


























Workers and rms are organized as follows. A worker can choose either to work for himself
and produce the consumption good, or he can choose to \sell" his production to a rm and earn
a wage instead. Firms are specialized | they can only employ workers with a single production
technology. Consequently, if a exible worker decides to switch production technologies, then
if she is working for a rm, she must quit her job and nd a job in the industry she wishes
to switch into (or simply work for herself). The fact that rms are specialized and so workers
8must switch employers in order to switch industries is a crucial assumption in our model that
we contend reects reality.9
Workers are also owners | they are free to invest in rms through the capital markets and
consume any dividend payments. In equilibrium, markets must clear | all rms must attract
enough investment capital to fulll their wage obligations.
Finally, we assume that all agents are innitely lived, with constant relative risk-aversion










log(c);  = 1;
c1 
1  ;  6= 1:
(8)
Throughout the paper, we assume an innite horizon economy. In our numerical calcululations
we use a nite horizon set-up, where the horizon is large enough to get convergence to the
solution of the innite horizon economy (i.e., the steady state solution). An advantage of this
approach is that it leads to a unique solution, allowing us to avoid the nontrivial issue of dening
transversality conditions to rule out bubble solutions in an economy with nonlinear dynamics.
3 Complete Markets Equilibrium
We begin by deriving the complete market Pareto optimal equilibrium and then explain how
this equilibrium can implemented. Because AtKtot maximizes total output, any Pareto optimal
equilibrium must have this output. Under the complete markets assumption a representative
agent with utility ur exists such that the solution to the representative agent problem is identical
to the solution of the multi-agent problem. Moreover, all agents have CRRA utility functions
with the same , so ur is also of the CRRA form, with the same . Thus, in a complete market

















9For example, Moscarini and Thomsson (2007) document that 63% of workers who changed occupations also
changed employers.
9where ^  = +r. Hence, the total value of human capital of all agents of each type (their total













Any Pareto optimal equilibrium features perfect risk sharing | all agents' consumption across
states have the same ordinal ranking. Moreover, because of the CRRA assumptions, it is well
known that a stronger result applies in our equilibrium | all agents' ratio of consumption across
any two states is the same. In other words, every agent consumes the same fraction of total
output in every state:
cI(s;t) =  AtKtot(s) =  At(KI(s) + (1   )KF(s)) (12)
cF(s;t) = (1   ) AtKtot(s) = (1   ) At(KI(s) + (1   )KF(s)) (13)
where cI and cF if the aggregate consumption of all the inexible and exible agents respectively
and  is the fraction of the total output consumed by all the inexible agents. Given that the





We can also view  as a function of the initial state, (s0). The following properties of  follow
immediately:
Lemma 4 The function (s0), dened by (14) satises the following conditions



















(iii)  is increasing for small s0 and decreasing for large s0.






In words, because inexible agents can never be less productive than exible agents, the equi-
librium fraction of consumption inexible agents consume is bounded above by , the fraction
of the economy they comprise. It is bounded below by the inexible consumption in the state
that their share of productivity is minimized, that is either when s = 0 or 1. Because inexible
agents share of productivity is lower both for low and high values of the state variable,  has
10an interior maximum. It therefore follows that if we dene s def = minfargmaxs0 (s0)g, then
0 < s < 1. The wealth share of the inexible agent is thus maximized at a nite value, s,
and we denote the wealth share at this point by   (s). Finally, as the state variable goes
to innity, both types of agents productivity converge to a linear function of the state variable
and, in addition, the value of insurance becomes negligible, so the equilibrium converges to one
with no risk sharing | each agent consumes what he produces.
To solve explicitly for the equilibrium requires computing the expectation in (11), which can
be done using standard techniques from dynamic programming:











^  + 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(s)2
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An immediate implication of this proposition is that the instantaneous risk free interest rate is
captured by the term in front of P:10
rs  ^  + (s)R(s)  
(s)2
2




In general, we will need to solve (15) numerically, which may be nontrivial because it is
dened over the whole of the positive real line, s 2 R+. It is also not a priori clear what the
boundary conditions are either at s = 0, or at s = 1 where Ps may become unbounded. We
can avoid these issues by making the transformation, z
def = s
s+1 to get:
Proposition 2 The price, P(s;t), of an asset that pays dividends (s;t), where (s;t) 








10Heuristically, a risk-free zero coupon bond with maturity at dt will have a price that is almost independent
of P, so Ps and Pss are close to zero. Therefore, the local dynamics are Pt   rsP = 0, i.e.,
dP
P =  rsdt so the
short term discount rate is indeed rs.
11where Q : [0;1]  [0;T] ! R+ solves the PDE



































and Q(z;T) = 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 follows along identical lines as the analysis in Parlour, Stanton,
and Walden (2009), where a similar transformation is made and it is shown that no boundary
conditions are needed at z = 0 and z = 1, and is therefore omitted. Without loss of generality,
we assume that A0 = 1 going forward, since all variables are homogeneous of degree zero or one
in A0. All the numerical solutions in this paper were derived by solving (18).
4 Implementation
To gain insight into how actual markets, which are far from complete, share risk, it is important
that we model these markets realistically. Hence, we restrict agents' and rms' ability to write
and trade contracts in the following ways:
Restriction 1
(i) Binding contracts cannot be written directly between agents.
(ii) Firms may enter into binding contracts with agents subject to the following restrictions:
(1) Limited liability may not be violated. (2) Workers and equity holders cannot be required
to make payments,
(iii) Banks may enter into short term debt contracts with agents and rms, paying an interest
rate rs.
These restrictions reect the practical limitations of markets. Because individualized binding
contracts cannot trade in anonymous markets a matching mechanism does not exist that would
allow for widespread use of bilateral contracts as a risk sharing device. Perhaps because there
are far fewer rms than agents in the economy, so it is easier to match rms and agents, we do
observe binding bilateral labor contracts written between agents and rms. However, even these
contracts are limited. Both equity and labor contracts are one sided in the sense that typically
rms commit to make payments to agents. Agents very rarely commit to make payments to
rms and courts rarely enforce such contracts. The only condition under which agents can enter
a contract that commits them to make payments is if they take a loan from a bank. Both rms
12and agents can either borrow or lend from a bank subject to the condition that in equilibrium
the supply of loans must equal the amount of deposits. Thus, the span of traded assets consists
of debt and equity. As we will see, there is no default in equilibrium so the interest rate banks
pay is the risk free rate.
We also impose the following restriction on the industries in which rms operate:
Restriction 2 Firms are restricted to operate in only one industry. That is, all workers in a
rm must have the same b and f.
In reality, most rms operate in a single industry. Although conglomerates do exist, even these
rms typically operate in only a few industries. Our results would not change if we allowed rms
to operate in nitely many industries. What we cannot allow is a rm that operates in every
industry.
We assume that there is a (very) small cost to dynamic trading in capital markets:
Restriction 3 Dynamic trading in equity markets imposes a utility cost of  = 0+ per unit
time.
This restriction captures transaction costs of active trading, as well as the utility cost of desig-
nating time and eort to active portfolio rebalancing strategies. The condition implies that an
equilibrium outcome that does not require active portfolio trading in asset markets dominates
an equilibrium that is identical in real terms, but that does require active portfolio trading. We
do not impose any transaction costs of switching jobs, although it can be argued that such costs
are also present, and in fact may be higher than the costs of dynamic trading in asset markets.
The reason we do not impose these costs is they would not change our results qualitatively,
although the analysis would be far less tractable.11
We are now ready to describe how the complete markets equilibrium can be implemented
under these restrictions. At rst glance it might appear as if asset markets are unnecessary. After
all, we allow rms to write bilateral contracts with agents, so by serving as an intermediary,
rms can eectively allow agents to write bilateral contracts between themselves. For example,
rms could hire both types of workers, pool their production and reallocate it by paying wages
equal to a constant fraction of the total. However, such contracts alone cannot implement the
Pareto optimal equilibrium. The reason is that in such an equilibrium, although risk is eciently
shared conditional on production, total production is not maximized | exible workers must
switch industries in order to maximize their production. But the only way for the rm to pool
production and reallocate it would be to extract a commitment of lifetime employment from
11The key point here is that, even with small friction costs of job-switching, it will still be optimal for the exible
agent to switch industries (and for the inexible agent to stay in the same industry), since the productivity loss
of not switching is signicant. The only dierence is that he will switch industries less often when the friction is
present.
13exible workers. Such a commitment is suboptimal. Because of the need for worker mobility,
both labor and asset markets are required to implement the complete markets equilibrium.
To achieve the complete market equilibrium all inexible agents sign a binding employment
contract with rms in the industry of their specialty that commits both parties to lifetime
employment.12 Agents give up all their productivity and in return receive a wage equal to
their Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation, (s0)AtKtot(s), in every future state s. Flexible
agents either choose to work for themselves, or work for rms and earn wages equal to their
productivity. This means that in some states inexible wages will exceed productivity. Because
rms cannot force investors to make payments, rms require capital to credibly commit to the
labor contract. They raise this capital by issuing limited liability equity. In states in which
wages exceed productivity, the rm uses this capital to make up the shortfall and does not pay
dividends. For the moment we restrict attention to states in which the capital in the rm is
positive.
Flexible agents purchase the equity by borrowing the required capital from the bank. Firms
then redeposit the capital in the bank (ensuring that the supply of deposits equals the demand
for loans) and pay instantaneous dividend ows equal to
At max(KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s);0);




(1   )KF(s) + max(KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s);0)   Ctrs

; (19)
where we assume (and later show) that exible agents always choose to adjust their bank loans
to match the capital rms deposit in the bank. Using (6), when dividends are positive, the term
in square brackets in (19) becomes
(1   )KF(s) + KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s)   Ctrs = (1   )Ktot(s); (20)
so exible agents consume their complete market allocation and dCt = 0. Similarly, when
dividends are zero we get




12In reality, employment contracts that bind workers are not enforceable. However, about half the working
population do in fact work for a single employer (see Hall (1982)). As we discuss in the conclusion, this suggests
that the lifetime employment contract is nevertheless common, that is, that rms use other means to commit
employees to lifetime employment.
14Now the stochastic change in rm capital equals the shortfall, that is,
dCt = (KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s))dt:
Substituting this expression into (21) gives
(1   )KF(s)   Ctrs + (KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s)) = (1   )Ktot(s); (22)
so the exible agent consumes his complete markets allocation in every state in which the rm's
capital is positive.
Finally, consider the rst time that either the value of the rm drops to zero or the rm's
capital drops to zero. In such a state the rm can raise additional capital by issuing new equity
(either by repurchasing existing equity for zero and issuing new equity to raise capital, or if the
equity is not worth zero, issuing new equity at the market price). Hence by always issuing new
capital in this state, the rm can ensure that neither its capital, nor its value, ever drops below
zero and that it never pays negative dividends. Thus in this equilibrium both agents always
consume their complete markets allocation which is Pareto optimal. This implies that exible
agents cannot be better o by following a dierent borrowing policy, justifying our assumption
that they will always choose to borrow the amount rms deposit in the bank. Moreover, since
this outcome implies a passive investment strategy for inexible, as well as exible, agents, this
equilibrium implementation is optimal under the assumption of a small but positive cost of
active rebalancing.13
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 3 The following implementation leads to the complete market Pareto ecient out-
come:
 Flexible workers either work for themselves or a rm which pays the instantaneous wage
wF = AtKF(st).
 Inexible workers work for publicly traded rms, which pay instantaneous wages equal to
a constant multiple of aggregate production. In aggregate, rms pay the inexible wage
wI = AtKtot(st):
 In states in which inexible productivity plus interest on bank deposits exceeds wages, rms
13In fact, if in addition one assumes a (small) one-time cost of stock market participation, it is easy to show
that this optimal implementation is unique, since it minimizes the fraction of the population that participates in
the market.
15pay dividends equal to
At[KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s)] (23)
and retain capital AtCt with dCt = 0
 In states in which inexible productivity plus interest on bank deposits does not exceed
wages, rms pay no dividends and reduce capital to make wage payments
dCt = (KI(s) + Ctrs   Ktot(s))dt (24)
 The exible workers own all the equity in the stock market. They pay for this equity by
borrowing the capital from banks. Firms redeposit the capital in banks. Flexible workers
optimally adjust their borrowing to ensure that at all times the supply of deposits equals
the demand for loans.
 Whenever: (1) the price of the rm drops to zero, the rm raises new capital by repur-
chasing old equity for nothing and issuing new equity or (2) the amount of capital drops
to zero, the rm raises new capital by issuing new equity at the market price.
There are three important distinguishing characteristics of this solution that reect reality.
First, it features limited capital market participation | only exible workers participate in cap-
ital markets. Indeed, because job mobility precludes exible workers from sharing risk in labor
markets they must participate in capital markets for any risk sharing to take place. Without
understanding the importance of the labor market, one might naively look at inexible workers'
wealth and conclude that because this wealth is non-tradable, they would be better o using
asset markets to hedge some of this exposure. In equilibrium inexible workers choose not to
further hedge their human capital risk exposure because it is too costly. Flexible workers choose
to hold equity, not because of a desire to hedge | they choose to increase the riskiness of their
position | but because of the compensation they receive in terms of a high equity risk premium.
The implication, that inexible workers choose not to participate in markets is consistent
with one of the most robust ndings in the literature | that wealth and education are positively
correlated with stock market participation (see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)). Clearly, exible
workers are wealthier in our model, but more importantly, if productive exibility derives from
education, then they are likely to be better educated. In fact, Christiansen, Joensen, and
Rangvid (2008) show that the degree of economics education is casually (positively) related to
stock market participation. They interpret this result as evidence that non-participation derives
from educational barriers to entry. But their results are also consistent with exibility. Not
all education provides productive exibility so we would expect to see variation in the type of
16education and stock market participation. Their study clearly documents this variation. Finally,
note that non-participation in capital markets implies that inexible workers also do not hold
bonds, that is, they choose not to save. This result might help to explain the low savings rate
observed in the U.S. | the reason workers choose not to save is that their labor contracts
eectively do the saving for them.
A second distinguishing characteristic of our solution is that rm equity can be thought of as
an option-like claim on total consumption. We therefore expect the volatility of equity returns
to exceed the volatility of total consumption. Because we do not have idiosyncratic risk in our
setting, this volatility imparts risk | equity is considerably more risky than total consumption.
That equity can be viewed as an option is well known. However, normally this insight is
derived using nancial leverage. In our case the rm has no debt, indeed it actually holds
cash. In a standard setting this would mean that equity would not have option characteristics,
indeed, because of the cash, equity would be less risky than the rm's assets. In our setting, it
is not nancial leverage that gives equity option-like characteristics, but the operating leverage
resulting from wage commitments. Notice that this operating leverage is considerably more
risky than the typical kind of operating leverage studied in the literature. Typically, rms have
the option to shut down | if a rm is losing money on the margin then it can reduce its scale
or shut down altogether. However, in our case rms optimally choose to give up this option |
they commit to continue to pay wages even when, ex post, the value maximizing decision would
be to shut down and pay out the remaining capital to equity holders. As we will demonstrate in
the next section, by giving up this option, the rm substantially increases the risk of its equity.
Finally, note that asset returns will vary with the business cycle in a highly nonlinear fashion,
because of the role of rms as insurers. This means that the unconditional link between real
variables and asset returns can look quite weak even though they are instantaneously perfectly
correlated. In fact, as we shall see, our results are in line with the ndings in Duee (2005), that
consumption and equity returns are only weakly related in bad times, but are highly correlated
in good times.
Two important challenges to the neoclassical asset pricing model are its inability to produce
a realistic equity risk premium and the seemingly large disparity between consumption and
equity volatility. As we have already pointed out, our model has the potential to meet these
challenges. Consequently, in the next section, we investigate whether, for realistic parameter
values, our model can reproduce the magnitude of the observed empirical anomalies.
5 Parameterization
The objective of this section is to show that the eects we have identied are rst order, that
is, large enough to potentially explain the empirical facts. We will demonstrate that for a set
of realistic parameter values, the model can match the magnitude of the important moments in
17the data. Although we view this as an achievement in itself | without the labor market, the
model in this paper, essentially a Lucas tree economy, could not come close to matching these
moments | deciding whether labor markets really can explain empirical puzzles such as limited
market participation will require further empirical investigation.
We assume that exible workers make up 1/3 of the working population, implying that 2/3
of the population choose not to participate directly in capital markets, in line with the estimates
reported in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, and Claessens (2003),
Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004), and Christiansen, Joensen, and Rangvid (2008). Assume that






K   bK   (1   b)
p
K   bK + 2K
2
p
K   bK + (1   b)
p
K   bK + K
 : (25)
It is easy to see that f satises the required conditions, leading to the total production of exible
agents











Figure 2: f(b): Flexible Agents' optimal choice of f for a given choice of b
We assume that exible workers' limiting productive sensitivity to the state variable, K, is
2.3 and that inexible workers all work in an industry with b =  b = 0:5; and f = f = 1:656.14
14Note that here we assume that f(b) = f implying that a state exists in which all workers work in the same
industry.
18The total production of inexible agents is then
KI(s) = 0:5 + 1:656s: (27)
These are the two production functions we plotted in Figure 1.
The state process, s, evolves according to (1), with parameter values  = 0:003,  = 6%
and s = 0:67. The economy is thus in a recession when s < 0:67 and when s > 0:67 it is in
a boom. With these parameters, the unconditional probability that 0 < st < 2 is 97%, so we
focus on this range. The long-term growth rate of the economy is r = 1:2%. This implies an
unconditional consumption growth volatility of about 4%, which is in line with what was used
in Mehra and Prescott (1985). We use standard values for the preference parameters. We pick
a relative risk aversion coecient of 8.5, within the range Mehra and Prescott (1985, p. 154)
consider reasonable, and impatience parameter  = 0:5%.
Variable Symbol Value
Inexible constant production b 0.5
Flexible Limiting Production Sensitivity K 2.3
Impatience Parameter  0.5%
Risk Aversion  8:5
Long-term Growth Rate r 1.2%
% of population Inexible  67%
Inexible variable production f 1.656
State Variable Volatility  6%
Initial s s0, s 1:8
Mean reversion speed  0.003
Long-term mean s 0.67
Initial Capital C0 0:88
Table 1: Parameter Values
We set the initial s equal to s. Since this implies that the inexible workers get their highest
possible share of production, it is never optimal for them to quit the rm and so they will never
have an incentive to depart from the long-term contract they sign with rms.
The initial capital the rm raises is arbitrary in our model | because we have an eectively
complete asset market, the Modigliani-Miller proposition implies that the rm's capital structure
is irrelevant. Of course, in a world with frictions the amount of capital raised will aected by
a tradeo between the benets (e.g., lower transaction costs) and costs (e.g., increased taxes
and agency costs). We pick a level of initial capital that ensures that rms almost never need
to return to capital markets15 and to match the price volatility of the market, which we set to
16.6%. This leads to initial capital of C0 = 0:88. Table 1 summarizes these parameter values.
15The expected time to renancing is over 1,000 years.
19We solve for the complete markets equilibrium by solving (18) numerically. Table 2 sum-
marizes this equilibrium. To compute Wi, we set  = Ki(s) for each agent type i 2 fI;Fg
in (15).16 We then compute , the inexible agents' wealth share, by solving (14) and get
65.0%. In this equilibrium the risk free rate is 4.2% and the rm's expected return is 8.3%,
leading to a equity risk premium of 4.2%. The model also delivers realistic second moments.
Firm volatility is 16.6% whereas consumption volatility is only 4.3%. More interesting is the
unconditional correlation between equity returns and consumption. Because this is a standard
neo-classical model, consumption prices assets, so the instantaneous correlation between equity
returns and consumption is either 1 or -1 (as we will shortly see, equity values can be decreasing
in the state variable). However, the average correlation across all states is only 0.4, that is, the
unconditional correlation (what empiricists typically measure) is substantially lower than the
instantaneous correlation. The instantaneous equity premium is re   rs = pccp. If we use
unconditional moments to evaluate this expression we get 0:40  8:5  4:3%  16:6% = 2:4%,
which is approximately half of the actual unconditional equity premium of 4:1%. This disparity
occurs because the unconditional estimate of the correlation is not a good proxy for the actual
variable of interest, the instantaneous correlation.
Variable Symbol Value
Risk Free Rate rs 4.2%
Firm Expected Return re 8.3%
Firm Volatility p 16.6%
Consumption Volatility c 4.3%
Wealth fraction ,  65.0%
Probability s < 2 97%
Unconditional correlation pc 0.40
Equity premium re   rs 4.2%
Table 2: Equilibrium Moment Values at s0
An important feature of the model is that the value of equity is highly non-linear in the state
variable. Note that the value of the rm, V (st;Ct), is equal to the amount of cash plus the value
of inexible worker productivity minus the value of the wage commitment:
V (st;Ct) = WI(st) + Ct   Wtot(st); (28)
16Notice that Ki(s) is time independent, so (18) degenerates into an ODE, and the price function is also time
independent. It is easy to show that the boundary condition at z = 1 for the ODE is Q(1) = 0. We know of no
simple boundary specication at z = 0, however, since the boundary is not absorbing for the square root process.
In other words, nding the transversality condition that rules out bubbles is nontrivial. Therefore, we solve the
PDE and let the terminal date, T, become so large that the solution becomes eectively time independent. This
is the correct, no-bubble, solution in the innite horizon economy.
20where Wtot() is the total value of production. As the top panel of Figure 3 demonstrates, this



















Figure 3: Value of equity (upper panel) and total dividends (lower panel) as a function
of s. The vertical dashed line marks  s, the average value of the state variable.
price function is highly nonlinear in s. Its option-like qualities are self evident. The function is
insensitive to the state variable for low values of s | it is actually slightly decreasing for very
low s. It then increases rapidly in a convex fashion for low to high s, after which it reaches a
maximum for very high s and becomes decreasing.
To understand the dynamic behavior of equity across the business cycle, note that as the
state of the economy worsens, dividend payouts decrease, reecting that fact that wages exceed
productivity. Consequently, the value of the rm drops sharply. To understand what happens
when the economy deteriorates further, we must rst understand the dynamics of interest rates.
21When the economy is in a very bad state, productivity is low but agents propensity to consume
does not drop by as much. The reason is that because the state variable is mean reverting, agents
understand that the current state is temporary. They therefore anticipate that the economy is
likely to improve and because they want to smooth consumption, they have a propensity to
borrow to consume. In equilibrium net borrowing is zero, so interest rates have to rise to clear
markets, as is evident in Figure 4. Because the rm holds cash, this increase in interest rates
generates interest income for the rm. Eventually, the increase in interest rates dominates the
decrease in worker productivity, so that dividends begin to increase again, as is evident in the
lower panel in Figure 3. The result is that for very low values of the state variable the value of
the rm is actually decreasing in s. Note that D and P are both nonnegative within the range
of the plots, and therefore there is no need for renancing within this range.17

















Figure 4: Expected Return: Expected return on the rm's stock (solid blue line)
and the (short) risk free rate (dotted red line). The vertical dashed line marks  s, the
average value of the state variable.
Because of this nonlinearity of the price function and the behavior of interest rates, the
equity risk premium is highly variable in the state variable. The instantaneous expected equity



















Using (28), Figure 4 plots this function, together with the risk-free rate. The most striking
element in the plot is the dierence in behavior of the equity risk premium in expansions and
contractions. When s >  s the equity risk premium is decreasing in the state variable, which
makes intuitive sense. Equity is an insurance contract, for high values of the state variable
the insurance contract is not very risky. In contractions, the equity risk premium continues to
increase as the state deteriorates, reaching a maximum of about 13%. But then, as the value
of equity becomes less sensitive to the state of the economy, the risk premium begins to drop
and, for low enough values of s, actually becomes negative. At the mean point of state variable,
s =  s = 0:67, expected stock returns are about 9.5%, which is close to the unconditional expected
return of 8.3%. However, at  s, the equity risk premium is 8.2%, which is substantially higher
than the unconditional equity premium of 4:1%.
An important implication of the nonlinearity in the price function is that it weakens the
link between consumption and returns. In particular, the correlation between consumption and
returns is dierent in expansions and contractions. The estimated correlation in our calibration
conditional on being in a contraction (s < 0:67) is 0.23, whereas the estimated correlation
conditional on being in an expansion (s > 0:67) is 0.81. This disparity is in line with the results
in Duee (2005) that the correlation between stock returns and consumption growth is low
(about 0) in bad times, and high (about 0.6) in good times.
It is informative to compare our results with those in Danthine and Donaldson (2002).
Although Danthine and Donaldson (2002) also model the eect of labor markets on asset prices,
they are unable to match the equity risk premium in a model without frictions.18 By introducing
frictions they are able to match the risk premium, but at the cost of perfect risk sharing. In
particular, to get a signicant risk premium, their restriction limiting market participation
becomes important. Without it, workers would invest in markets and thereby increase risk
sharing. Not only would the equilibrium not feature limited stock market participation, but the
ability to share additional risk would likely reduce the risk premium. Because we do not impose
limited capital market participation, exible workers must be induced to take on additional risk
in equilibrium. That implies that the return on equity (the means by which exible workers
take on this risk) has to be high enough to induce this behavior. This is a key insight in our
model | rather than a place to hedge risk and smooth consumption, asset markets are a place
where investors are induced to take on extra risk.
Because we do not have idiosyncratic risk in our model, an increase in the risk premium must
18They introduce two frictions in their model: (1) Adjustment costs, which provides only a modest increase in
the risk premium and (2) changes in the \bargaining power" of workers and investors that eectively prevents
perfect risk sharing.
23be associated with an increase in volatility. Figure 5 conrms this insight. The volatility of the
rm initially explodes in bad states, in line with the empirical evidence cited in the introduction.
But then it actually starts decreasing, reecting the fact that the value of equity becomes less
sensitive to the state variable (see Figure 3, top panel), until it actually reaches zero close to 0:2.
For even lower s, price is decreasing in s, and so volatility increases. Finally, volatility decreases
again as s approaches 0 and as the volatility of ds becomes negligible, once again decreasing the
equity volatility. Thus, the volatility of the rm is a nonlinear function of s, with regions of very
high volatility in bad states of the world. More importantly, the same is not true of the volatility
of consumption growth | it is virtually unaected by the level of s. Our model actually delivers
an almost complete disconnect between consumption volatility and asset volatility, something
that is traditionally regarded as perhaps the greatest challenge to the neoclassical asset pricing
model. This gure, more than any other, makes clear how the interaction between labor and
nancial markets can dramatically aect the inferences of the neoclassical asset pricing model.
In our model, the consumption CAPM holds by construction. In line with the empirical evidence
referenced in the introduction, consumption growth volatility is low and virtually unaected by
the business cycle. Asset volatility, on the other hand, is signicantly higher and is very sensitive
to the business cycle.
Finally, it makes sense to consider how the equilibrium changes as a function of the initial
state. Figure 6 plots the equilibrium share of total consumption of inexible agents, (s0).
What is clear is that for most values of the state variable, the equilibrium consumption share is
insensitive to the initial state. The gure also shows the initial aggregate instantaneous relative
productivity, KI
Ktot, of inexible agents. We see that KI
Ktot, reaches its maximum,  (i.e., 2/3), at
s0  0:7, whereas   0:64 occurs at s0 = s  1:8. The reason  is maximized to the right
of the point where the inexible agent's relative productivity is maximized is that the value
of insurance is greater in the bad states than in the good states. Hence, inexible agents are
willing to pay more for insurance at the point where their production share is maximized than
at points to the right, so  continues to increase.
6 Conclusions
Our objective in this paper is to demonstrate the potential importance of explicitly modeling
labor markets within the neoclassical asset pricing model. We show that neither the asset mar-
ket nor the labor market, by themselves, can share risk eciently. Labor markets are restricted
because it is inecient for some workers to enter long-term contracts, and asset markets are
restricted because the (static) asset span is too narrow. But together the two markets can share
risk eciently. By explicitly modeling the interaction between the two markets, we demonstrate
the potential to explain some of the most important normative challenges faced by the neoclas-
sical asset pricing model: (1) limited asset market participation, (2) the seemingly high equity















Figure 5: Volatility: The blue solid curve is rm volatility (V 0
V (s)), and the red dotted
curve is consumption growth volatility (
K0
tot
Ktot(s)). The vertical dashed line marks  s, the
average value of the state variable.
risk premium, (3) the very large disparity in the volatility of consumption and the volatility
of asset prices, and (4) the time dependent correlation between consumption growth and asset
returns.
Although our model is stylized it captures most of the salient features of both labor and
asset markets. The one apparent exception is that in the model it is optimal for some agents
to commit to lifetime employment with a single rm. In reality, although rms often commit
to employ agents, rarely do agents explicitly commit to stay with rms. Nevertheless, there is
strong empirical evidence suggesting that in fact a large subset of employees implicitly commit
to rms, consistent with the assumptions of our model. Hall (1982) nds that after an initial
job search in which employees might work for short periods for dierent employers, half of all
men then work the rest of their lives for a single employer.
There are a number of ways employees may implicitly commit to rms. First, employees
might never actually face an incentive to leave, making an explicit commitment unnecessary as
is the case in our parameterization in Section 5. To the extent that there are costs to switching
jobs, workers will not choose to switch jobs so long as the switching costs exceed the benets.



























Figure 6: Sensitivity of the Equilibrium to the Initial State: The solid curve is the
equilibrium share of wealth of the inexible worker at t = 0, , as a function of the initial s0.
The dashed curve is the inexible agents aggregate share of total productivity at time 0.
Because (s) is at around s (see Figure 6), only a small cost of switching jobs is required to
ensure that agents will not have an incentive to switch jobs for most starting values of s.
Second, agents can increase the costs of switching further and thereby eectively commit to
rms by, for example, accepting deferred compensation contracts. Examples include pension
funds and stock vesting periods. In addition many union contracts explicitly tie wages to
seniority with the rm, making a job switch very costly.
Third, the initial training costs that workers must bear when they start a new job act
as a commitment device. Although employers might ultimately compensate workers for these
costs through higher long-term wages, workers will have to remain employed to collect this
compensation.
Notice that while it is socially suboptimal for inexible workers to switch jobs, it is optimal
for exible workers to do so. Hence, one might expect to see dierences in the costs of switching,
because incentives exist to lower the switching costs for exible workers and increase these costs
for inexible workers. This observation might explain why, for example, head hunters tend to
specialize in managerial jobs (where the skill set can be readily transfered across industries).
26Although outside the scope of this paper, our model has potentially interesting implications
for the cross-section of asset returns. For simplicity we assumed only one type of rm in our
calibration, but, in general, rms with dierent labor market exposures will have expected
returns which will depend on the insurance contract that the rm signs with its workers. Firms
that are sensitive to changes in s (i.e., rms with bi close to 0), will provide more insurance in
bad states than rms that are less sensitive (rms with bi close to 1). Equity holders in these
rms will therefore require higher returns. In addition, because of the non-linearity of returns,
CAPM betas | either unconditional or conditional | are likely to have little explanatory power
in the cross section.
Because inexible workers only consume their wage income, our model implies that the wages
of inexible workers should have explanatory power in the cross-section. A measure of labor
mobility across rms (which should be closely related to our exibility notion) is constructed in
Donangelo (2009), using survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics between 1988-2008.
Such a measure could potentially be used to disentangle the two sides of the work force. It is
also interesting to note that in our model aggregate wages, which include wages of both exible
and inexible workers | i.e., wages of both \insurers" and \insurees" | should be considerably
less informative about expected returns, in line with the ndings of Fama and Schwert (1977).
These observations provide a potentially interesting path for future research.
27Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: (a) Follows since f is decreasing and f(0) = 1.
(b) Clearly, Ks  CF(s)  Ks + 1 for all s, since the lower bound can be realized by choosing
b(s) = 1, and the upper bound follows from the constraint that b  1. (b) therefore immediately follows.
(c) Follows since b+f(b)s is (weakly) convex as a function of s for each b and the maximum of a set
of convex functions is convex.
Proof of Lemma 2: The exible worker solves maxb2[0;1] b+f(b)s: The rst order condition is f0(b) =
 1
s, and since f0 is a continuously dierentiable, strictly decreasing, mapping from [0;1] onto ( 1;0], the
implicit function theorem implies that there is a unique, decreasing, continuously dierentiable solution
to the rst order condition, b(s), such that b(0) = 1 and lims!1 b(s) = 0. Since the second order
condition is f00(b)s < 0, this function indeed yields the maximal strategy, KF(s) = b(s) + f(b(s))s.
Now, K0
F(s) = b0(s) + b0(s)f(b(s))s + f(b(s)) = 0 + f(b(s)), so K0
F(0) = f(b(0)) = f(1) = 0,
and K0
F(1) = f(b(1)) = f(0) = K. Moreover, K00
F(s) = b0(s)f0(b(s)) =  
b
0(s)
s , which is continuous
and positive, so KF is indeed strictly convex and twice continuously dierentiable.










































b > 0, so for small s, the
inexible worker's productivity indeed has higher volatility.


























f, but since b(s) ! 0 for large s (from the proof of Lemma 2)
and therefore f(b(s)) ! K, the exible worker's productivity is indeed riskier for large s. The lemma is
proved.
Proof of Proposition 1: From (9), the price at t = 0 of a general asset, paying an instantaneous





















28From Feynman-Kac's formula (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1991)) it follows that Q 2 C1;2(R+ R+),
and that Q satises the PDE
Qt + (s)Qs +
(s)2
2






Since Ktot is smooth, it follows that P is also smooth and since Q = P
K
















































Ktot, we arrive at (15).
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